Current issue: 55(5)
Under compilation: 56(1)
The existence and direction of causal relationships between the time series for the Finnish roundwood market for the period 1960–1994 is tested. Using simple bivariate analysis, we found evidence that for both logs and pulpwood, the lagged prices are helpful in forecasting quantity for the next year, but not vice versa. Saw log stumpage prices have significantly Granger-caused pulpwood prices over the business cycles, but the effect has diminished towards the present time. For quantities traded, the direction of causality was rather from pulpwood to saw logs. The consistency of bivariate test results was checked by the Granger-causality tests within trivariate VAR-models for both markets, and the results were found to be fairly similar to bivariate tests. The price fluctuations in the international markets for forest products have been found to be carried to domestic wood markets dominantly via the pulpwood part of the market.
In order to understand the present forest policies for the small woodlot of Quebec, it is essential to understand the history of settlement of Quebec. Following this brief description, the author introduces the various forest policies (programs) which have been initiated in Quebec by various levels of governments in order to deal with the management of these lands.
Standard methods of welfare economics are used in a market simulating framework to evaluate policy measures designed to increase future timber supplies. Forest management cost-share programs are examined using this methodology. The differential regional impact of cost-share payments is considered, as is the distribution of these benefits between stumpage producers (owners of forest land) and stumpage consumers (producers of forest products). Previous estimates of the welfare gains that would result from a higher level of forest management cost-share payments in the southern United States are revised to account for the loss of public revenue resulting from lower future prices. A methodology for comparing alternative policy instruments is discussed, and a preliminary, qualitative comparison is made between the use of cost-share payments and alternative policy measures.
In this paper the system of collective timber price agreement in Norway is described. The history of »collective behaviour» in the roundwood market can be tracked far back in history, with different degrees of importance, and it has totally dominated the price-formation of roundwood from the 1950’s until the present. In trying to answer the question »What has been the effect of the collective price agreements» a few theoretical market models are used and the empirical data are also employed. Both the theoretical discussion and the empirical data seem to indicate that the forest owners are better off with collective price agreements than with a situation where there are no organized price-negotiations.
The PDF includes a summary in English.
The aim of this paper was to shape and analyse certain alternatives in the development processes in the organization chains of Finnish forestry. The material was collected by analysing market structures and characteristics of competition with regard to raw wood and forest industry products.
The paper presents two alternative ways to rationalize the organization chains between the forest owner’s organizations and forest industry. In the price mechanism of raw wood originating from Finnish private forests there there has been increasing influence of the central organizations of the private forest owners and forest industry. In their relationship, the model of bilateral monopolistic competition can be chosen as a conceptual framework.
Under bilateral monopoly price is fixed as a result of negotiations between competitive parties, and the position and tactics within the negotiations are of great importance for the negotiating parties. Because of the competition, Finnish forest industry cannot compensate the increase in the production costs by raising independently the export prices of its products. This and the fact that the annual earnings of forest workers are fixed by law to the earnings of the workers in wood-processing industry, will cause pressure on stumpage prices.
In the paper two schemes are outlined. In the Scheme 1 a development alternative is described in which the organization chain of private forest owners is supposed to develop to the industry growing direction. In the Scheme 2 the organization chain of private forest owners is supposed to develop to the organizational orientated direction.
It is concluded that as long as the forest owners’ organizational orientated central organization is too weak to form a monopoly as counterweight to the monopsol of forest industry (except the industries of forest owners), it will consider the industry growing direction superior to the organizational orientated alternative.
The PDF includes a summary in English.