Current issue: 54(2)
The Private Forest Act came into force in 1928 in Finland. According to the act, felling of a mature stand should not endanger natural regeneration of the site, and an intermediate felling should not conflict with justifiable thinnings. 18 District Forestry Boards were appointed to enforce the compliance of the act. The aim of this investigation was to study what kinds of violations against the Private Forest Act were found in the fellings, what were the consequences, and how the fellings were overseen.
The investigation is based on 2,477 felling inspections made by the District Forestry Boards in cases where forest devastation was suspected. The report divides the different kinds of violations by the different District Forestry Boards, years, the size of forest holdings, ownership of the forest holdings and by executor of the felling. Over half of the inspections were held on fellings done by the forest owner, 14% by the forest industry, and 11% by a broker of timber. Neglecting the obligation to give a notification of felling had increased in the period of 1929-1938. Also, the cases of forest devastation increased slightly. The report suggests some improvements in the act that would, for instance, increase activity of the forest owners to give the required notification of fellings before the felling takes place.
The PDF includes a summary in German.
The aim of this paper was to shape and analyse certain alternatives in the development processes in the organization chains of Finnish forestry. The material was collected by analysing market structures and characteristics of competition with regard to raw wood and forest industry products.
The paper presents two alternative ways to rationalize the organization chains between the forest owner’s organizations and forest industry. In the price mechanism of raw wood originating from Finnish private forests there there has been increasing influence of the central organizations of the private forest owners and forest industry. In their relationship, the model of bilateral monopolistic competition can be chosen as a conceptual framework.
Under bilateral monopoly price is fixed as a result of negotiations between competitive parties, and the position and tactics within the negotiations are of great importance for the negotiating parties. Because of the competition, Finnish forest industry cannot compensate the increase in the production costs by raising independently the export prices of its products. This and the fact that the annual earnings of forest workers are fixed by law to the earnings of the workers in wood-processing industry, will cause pressure on stumpage prices.
In the paper two schemes are outlined. In the Scheme 1 a development alternative is described in which the organization chain of private forest owners is supposed to develop to the industry growing direction. In the Scheme 2 the organization chain of private forest owners is supposed to develop to the organizational orientated direction.
It is concluded that as long as the forest owners’ organizational orientated central organization is too weak to form a monopoly as counterweight to the monopsol of forest industry (except the industries of forest owners), it will consider the industry growing direction superior to the organizational orientated alternative.
The PDF includes a summary in English.